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Comments on François Recanati’s Men-
tal Files: Doubts about Indexicality
David Papineau
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BIBLID [0873-626X (2013) 36; pp. 159-175]
François Recanati has written a valuable and timely book. The sug-
gestion that thought involves the deployment of ‘mental files’ has 
been around for some decades, and is becoming increasingly popu-
lar, but until now there has been no sustained examination of the 
idea. Recanati has developed a detailed theory of mental files, and 
future treatments will take his book as their starting point.
I am very much in favour of the general lines of Recanati’s ap-
proach. In particular, I fully support his policy of dealing with Frege 
cases, not by introducing some extra semantic level additional to ref-
erential value, but simply by appealing to the possibility that different 
vehicles of thought can be used to refer to the same entity. Recanati 
shows convincingly that a multiplication of descriptive senses or ex-
tra ‘intensions’ is quite unnecessary to deal with Frege cases. All we 
need is the idea that distinct mental files can refer to a single entity.
I also fully support Recanati’s decision to focus on the individual 
rather than the community. Recanati’s mental files are possessed by 
individuals, and he offers no general account of when different in-
dividuals might be said to ‘grasp the same concept’. In this respect 
his book contrasts with Mark Sainsbury and Michael Tye’s recent 
Seven Puzzles of Thought (Oxford University Press 2012), which is in 
many respects consistent with Recanati’s approach, but which seeks 
primarily to articulate a notion of a public concept rather than that 
of an individual’s mental file.  I myself am very doubtful that any one 
notion can do justice both to the public and individual dimensions of 
thought; indeed I remain to be convinced that there is any real work 
for the idea of a public concept, once we have a good account of in-
dividual mental files and the use of words to communicate them. So 
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I think that Recanati does well to focus on the individual rather than 
the social level.
However, as is only to be expected, there are aspects of Recana-
ti’s book with which I disagree. In particular, I think that his adop-
tion of an ‘indexical model’ for mental files leads him astray in vari-
ous ways. In these comments I shall focus on his use of this model. 
In the first two sections below I shall point out some ways in which 
this model can be misleading. After that I shall argue that, when it 
comes to ‘demonstrative files’, the model is not only misleading but 
positively erroneous.
1 The indexical model
Recanati models the workings of mental files on the way that indexi-
cal words function in language.
Linguistic indexicality is familiar enough. Indexical word types 
— such as ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘I’, ‘you’ — do not have referents to call 
their own.  There is no particular time referred to by the word type 
‘now’, nor any particular person referred to by the word type ‘you’. 
In this respect, indexical word types contrast with proper names 
types — ‘Timbuktu’ — or natural kind term types — ‘gold’ — 
which  have standing referents, so to speak.1
It is only tokens (specific dated uses) of indexical words types that 
have referents. The way this works is familiar. The indexical word 
types have a ‘character’ that specifies how the context of utterance of 
any token of that type will determine a referent for that token. Thus 
the character of the type ‘now’ specifies that any token use of this 
word type will refer to the time at which the relevant utterance is 
being made; similarly the character of the type ‘you’ specifies that 
any token use of this word type will refer to the person to whom the 
relevant utterance is being addressed; and so on.
Recanati’s thought is that mental files work like indexical words. 
Token mental files fall into types, depending on the kind of ‘epis-
1 Perhaps proper names are not so non-indexical as they initially appear.  More 
than one person is called ‘David Papineau’. One account of how such proper 
names manage to refer is that ‘David Papineau’ is a type the tokens of which get 
attached indexically to specific people on occasion of use (Pelczar 2001).
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temically rewarding relation’ that the token bears towards its refer-
ent. For example, tokens of the perceptually demonstrative mental 
file type that man will bear a potentially fruitful epistemic relation to 
the man to whom the relevant thinker is currently attending. This 
species of ‘epistemically rewarding relation’, in conjunction with the 
relevant thinker’s context, then determines a referent for any token 
of that man, analogously to the way that the character of an indexi-
cal word type plus a context determines a referent for any indexical 
word token. Similarly, tokens of the mental file type here will refer 
the place where the thinker is currently located; and tokens of the 
mental file type I will refer to the person who is using that token in 
thought.
Recanati applies this indexical model to mental files in general. 
He argues that even his ‘encyclopaedic’ files conform to the model. 
Encyclopaedic files are distinguished by the fact their existence does 
not depend on any specific epistemic relation to their referent. My 
Barack Obama file can survive the loss of any specific epistemic re-
warding relationship to him (I might forget his name, or alternatively 
forget what he looks like and cease to be able to identify him visu-
ally) as long as some (any) such rewarding relationships remain. For 
Recanati, this is enough to bring encyclopaedic files under the in-
dexical model. The crucial point, as he sees it, is that their referents 
are still contextually determined. The referent of my Obama file is 
determined as that item in my context to which the file bears some 
(any) epistemically rewarding relations.
2 There is less mental than linguistic indexicality
I have no objection to the idea that the referents of mental files are 
generally contextually determined, and Recanati is of course free 
to use the term ‘indexicality’ to express this idea if he wishes. But 
there is a danger that this usage will obscure the fact that there is a 
lot less indexicality in the mental realm, so to speak, than Recanati’s 
analogy between mental and linguistic ‘indexicality’ might lead one 
to expect.
Consider first Recanati’s ‘I’ files. These are mental files which 
each subject possesses, distinguished by the special epistemic rela-
tionship of self-knowledge that each subject bears to itself. I have my 
I file, you have yours, and so on. In the normal case, each of us uses 
our I file throughout our life as a repository in which to accumulate 
information about ourselves. These are the tokens of the I file type: 
that type, to be specific, whose tokens acquire their reference in vir-
tue of bearing the self-knowledge relationship to particular thinking 
subjects.
Now consider the English word ‘I’. The character of this word 
type specifies that any of its tokens will refer to the user of that to-
ken. So on many occasions English speakers will use the type word 
‘I’, and on each of those occasions the token so uttered will refer 
to whomever is speaking. In this case, and by contrast with mental 
I files, the normal understanding is that even the different uses of 
‘I’ by a given individual on different occasions will each comprise 
different tokens of the type. If I use ‘I’ this evening when talking to 
my wife on Monday, and then again on Thursday when talking to a 
student, these are naturally taken to be two different tokens of ‘I’, 
each separately assigned me as referent in virtue of the principle that 
all such uses refer to the speaker.
It is understandable enough that we should so cut things up differ-
ently in the mental and linguistic cases. Mental I files normally func-
tion as repositories for all the information that individuals acquire 
about themselves in the course of their life. Viewed in this way, it is 
essential that they persist for as long as their possessors survive. They 
need to be able to accumulate information over lifetimes.
‘I’ words, by contrast, have no such corresponding function. 
There is no obvious sense in which bodies of information get attached 
to tokens of the ‘I’ word type, and a fortiori no sense in which an ac-
cumulating body of information is attached to all of a given person’s 
‘I’ utterances. So there is no reason to lump all of a given person’s ‘I’ 
utterances into different manifestations of a single ‘I’ token, in the 
way that Recanati lumps together all a given person’s rehearsals of 
their mental I.2
2 Perhaps this is a bit quick. If I use the type word ‘I’ repeatedly in the course 
of a single conversation, then shouldn’t we count these as different uses of the same 
token, on the grounds that in general intra-conversational uses of indexical words 
are most naturally read, given the conventions of anaphora, as repetitions of the 
same token term (and so as ‘de jure’ co-referential)?  I am happy to grant this. But 
my more general point remains. For these considerations provide no argument 
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The upshot is that mental I files display a lot less indexicality than 
linguistic ‘I’ words. Whereas I must have deployed millions of lin-
guistic tokens of the type word ‘I’ in the course of my life, I have 
only ever deployed one mental token of the I file type.
Now consider encyclopaedic files like my Obama file. For Re-
canati, this is an ‘indexical’ file in virtue of having its referent fixed 
contextually (as that item to which the file bears some epistemically 
rewarding relations). Again, I worry that this terminology may be 
misleading about the structure of encyclopaedic files.
Let us ask how encyclopaedic files are supposed to conform to the 
type-token structure displayed by other indexical constructions. My 
personal Obama file is presumably a token of the relevant type. This 
token will persist as long as I remain able to think of Obama, and 
will serve as a repository for all the information that I accumulate 
about him in this time. It is this token whose reference is contextu-
ally fixed as Obama himself.
But what now is the type of which this personal file is a token? A 
first thought might be that it is the category which contains all the 
other token personal encyclopaedic files possessed by people who 
can think about Obama, whether by recognizing him, or by know-
ing his name, or any mix of these and other epistemically rewarding 
relations. But this seems wrong. After all, those tokens all have the 
same referent, namely Barack Obama. And given this there seems 
nothing to stop us saying that the type itself has this standing refer-
ent. But this is in tension with the idea that indexical types have no 
referent to call their own.
As far as I can see, the only good way to fit the personal encyclo-
paedic Obama files into the standard indexical type-token structure 
would be to view them as tokens of the type encyclopaedic file (or per-
haps encyclopaedic person file). This type would have no reference of its 
own, and each of its tokens (such as an Obama file, or a my first teacher 
file, or a that-woman-down-the-road file...) would then have its referent 
fixed as that thing (person) in the relevant thinker’s environment to 
for identifying tokens of ‘I’ across conversations. If I use ‘I’ on Monday in one 
conversation, and then on Thursday in another, these are surely two tokens each 
separately assigned a reference in context. So we still have a contrast with mental 
I files, where the same token of the I type needs to stay with me from Monday to 
Thursday, and indeed for the rest of life.
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which the relevant file bears some epistemically rewarding relation.
This would work all right, but it would be strange, and certainly 
wouldn’t line up with any indexical constructions present in natu-
ral languages. We certainly don’t have some type word the tokens of 
which refer variously to Obama, my first teacher, that woman down 
the road, ..., depending on the context in which those tokens are 
uttered.
This is not yet a substantial criticism of Recanati’s account of en-
cyclopaedic files. I have no objection to his central idea that they have 
their referents fixed contextually. Still, it does seem unhelpful to use 
the term ‘indexical’ to express this idea. If such paradigmatically 
permanent files as my Obama file are classed together with ‘here’ and 
‘now’ files as similarly ‘indexical’, I cannot help feeling that some 
important distinctions are being lost.
3 You thoughts
So far I have argued only that Recanati’s ‘indexical’ model for mental 
files needs to be treated with care, given the extent to which some of 
his mental files display rather less indexicality than this terminology 
might initially lead readers to expect.
However, I worry that there is a more substantial danger in Re-
canati’s emphasis on indexicality: the thought that mental files share 
the structure of linguistic indexicals can encourage us to multiply 
mental files beyond necessity. In this section I shall illustrate this 
danger by considering the possibility of ‘you’ files. In the next sec-
tion I shall apply the morals I draw to ‘perceptual demonstrative’ 
files. (While Recanati does not himself posit ‘you’ files, ‘perceptual 
demonstrative’ files play a central role in his project.)
Suppose I am thinking that John Colleague gave a good talk yes-
terday, and that I must tell him this next time I see him. At that mo-
ment, lo and behold, he comes into the common room. ‘You gave a 
good talk yesterday’, I say to him.
Now, my utterance unquestionably contains an indexical type 
word, ‘you’, tokens of which are conventionally understood as re-
ferring the person to whom the utterance is addressed. But should 
we think of me as expressing a thought involving a correspondingly 
indexical you file? When John looms into view, do I form a token 
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thought file of the you type, a distinctively ‘second-person’ file whose 
reference is fixed via the relation it bears to the addressee of the 
thinker’s current utterance?
This would seem an unattractive move (and indeed Recanati does 
not make it). I don’t need to form any extra you file when I am about 
to address John, beyond any files about him I already have. So there 
is no reason to suppose that my utterance ‘You gave a good talk yes-
terday’ expresses some corresponding indexical you thought. Rather 
it is just the linguistic means that I use to express a pre-existing non-
second-person thought.
Recanati agrees, in the course of discussing how thoughts get 
communicated in speech. His view (222-3) is that when a speaker’s 
utterance u contains ‘you’, the information that the hearer ‘is the ad-
dressee of u’ will be in the file that the speaker is using to think about 
the hearer, and also in the hearer’s first-person I file. This informa-
tion will ‘stand for’ the relevant files, and ‘trigger their activation’, 
but it will not contribute to the content of what is being communi-
cated.
This seems quite right to me. We don’t need you files to explain 
the content of what speakers say about their hearers.
Still, perhaps the point bears a bit more examination. Note that 
something inside the speaker needs to figure out that, in the context, 
‘you’ is the appropriate word with which to give public verbal ex-
pression to the thought that, say, John gave a good talk yesterday.
Presumably, the production of the relevant utterance is informed 
by the speaker’s information that (a) John is the (potential) address-
ee, and (b) ‘you’ is the right word to communicate to a current ad-
dressee any thought that refers to that same addressee.
But if this is right, then it seems that there must be re-usable 
mental term current addressee in the speaker’s mental economy, with 
which to formulate the information in (a) and (b). And this then ar-
gues that we should recognize that in thought there is a type of refer-
ring mental term (current addressee), tokens of which are used on par-
ticular occasions to mediate inferences about when to use the word 
‘you’ to express some thought.
So it does look as if there is indeed a referring mental type (current 
addressee) which works very like the linguistic type indexical ‘you’, 
in that tokens of both will refer to whoever is currently (potentially) 
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being addressed.
Still, even though we do need to recognize these re-usable mental 
types, there is no reason to think that they should be dignified as 
files, nor that they play any significant role in thought.
As I see it, the mental type in question operates mainly in the sub-
personal speech production system. Once this speech-production 
system ‘knows’ that John  is the current addressee, it will set itself to ex-
press all John-referring thoughts using the word ‘you’. In the normal 
case, I don’t need to think about how to express my thoughts. My se-
lection of words is generated automatically, courtesy of an automatic 
and unconscious system that figures out what grammatical string of 
words will best serve to express my thought in the current context.
True, there will need to be some interaction between the sub-
personal speech production system and personal level conceptual 
thought, in order to derive the crucial interfacing information 
that, say, John is the current addressee. We can’t eliminate conceptual 
thought in deriving this conclusion, for after all there is no limit to 
the kind of conceptual information about John that might be relevant 
(suppose you know that John often goes around in disguise, but can’t 
resist custard cream biscuits ... and you use this information to figure 
that the strange bearded man in the common room must be John.)
Still, this doesn’t mean that the term current addressee itself needs 
to function as an information-accumulating file in our person-level 
cognitive economy. Once a judgement like John is the current addressee 
has been arrived at, it will be handed over to the speech production 
system, and this token of current addressee will cease to play any role 
in person-level thought.3 Moreover the speech production system it-
self certainly won’t treat this token as some file whose function is to 
gather and preserve any further information about its referent. Its 
only use for this token is to register that John is the current addressee 
and thence direct that John thoughts should be expressed with ‘you’.
3 This argues against Recanati’s suggestion that some such item as ‘is the ad-
dressee of u’ will generally get entered into speakers’ files for the person in ques-
tion. Since this information is only needed by the unconscious mechanisms that 
put thoughts into words, there is no obvious reason to keep a record of it. Perhaps 
this is part of the explanation of why I can often remember conversations in some 
detail without being able to remember whom I had them with.
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So, all in all, even though we need to recognize that there are 
referring mental terms current addressee with an indexical structure 
like ‘you’, these terms will not function as mental files.
4 Demonstrative files and their problems
Let me now turn to demonstrative files. This is where I think that 
the indexical analogue is genuinely damaging. It encourages the view 
that there are token mental files corresponding to token linguistic 
demonstratives, when in truth there is nothing corresponding in our 
actual cognitive structure.
Recanati has a distinct species of demonstrative files (that thing, 
that woman) which are opened when a thinker is in perceptual rapport 
with some item, and which survive and accumulate information as 
long as that rapport is maintained.
An immediate query about these files concerns cases where we 
think about some previously perceived item even though we have 
ceased to be in continuous perceptual contact with it. So for example 
I might recall the woman I saw this morning, along with the infor-
mation I then acquired about her. Or I might recognize that woman 
when I see her again this afternoon, again remembering the informa-
tion I acquired earlier.
A natural first thought is that in such cases we reactivate the de-
monstrative file that we opened when we first saw the woman this 
morning. This would explain the current availability of any infor-
mation we acquired in that earlier encounter. However, Recanati 
cannot say this. The demonstrative file that I originally formed dis-
appears along with the termination of the epistemically rewarding 
perceptual contact on which it is based.
Recanati’s response to this query is to multiply files. As well as 
the original perceptual demonstrative file, I will also have a ‘memory 
demonstrative file’ (62), and a ‘recognitional file’ (71). Memory de-
monstrative files exist in virtue of an epistemically rewarding memory 
relation that the thinker bears to the relevant item; as long as one 
can remember the earlier encounter, one can think of the woman in 
question as that woman [whom I saw]. Recognitional files exist in virtue 
of an epistemically rewarding relation of familiarity; as long as one is 
capable of recognizing the item in question, one can think of it via a 
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recognitional file.
So, on Recanati’s view, when I later recall the woman that I saw 
this morning, or later recognize her, I am not reactivating my origi-
nal perceptual file, but rather activating new and different files, a 
memory demonstrative file, or a recognitional file.
However, now Recanati faces a different query. When I later 
think about the woman, either via memory or via recognition, I will 
presumably have available all the information about her that I ac-
quired from my earlier perceptual encounter this morning. But Re-
canati cannot take this as given. That earlier-acquired information 
was originally deposited in my perceptual demonstrative file, a file 
that is distinct from memory file and recognitional file, and indeed 
no longer exists. So there is no immediate guarantee that the infor-
mation it contained will be available elsewhere.
Recanati’s response is that the relevant information from the 
original demonstrative file will be transferred to the memory file and 
recognitional file. These latter files will inherit the information orig-
inally deposited in the perceptual demonstrative file, and so will be 
able to activate it in thought, and augment it via further encounters 
with the referent.
5 A simpler view
Well, all this adds up to a cogent story, but it strikes me as gratu-
itously complicated. Why have so many files when one would do? 
Here is an alternative picture. When I first encounter some item per-
ceptually, I open a potentially permanent file in which to accumulate 
information about that item. That file outlasts the original encoun-
ter, and the same file is reactivated when I remember the relevant 
item or re-encounter it. The information earlier acquired is thus au-
tomatically available on those later occasions, and can be added to 
when new facts are acquired, without any need for any multiplication 
of files. (See Papineau 2006.)
On this view, the files that we open on first perceptual encoun-
ters, and in general on coming into any contact with any new item 
of thought, are name-like. They are designed to be permanent reposi-
tories of information about the item in question, and are not depen-
dent on any particular sources of information about that object. In 
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this respect they are akin to Recanati’s ‘encyclopaedic’ files, whose 
function is to gather information about some referent from whatever 
sources offer themselves.
Of course, there will be occasional cases where we open two such 
files for what is in fact the same referent. I encounter a woman (or a 
tree, or a chair, ...) and then later on I encounter it again without re-
alizing that it is the same one. Or I already have a well-developed file 
for John Perry, say, and then don’t realize that the man I am talking to 
at the party is him. But nothing in this requires us to multiply types of 
file. In such cases we will simply have two name-like files containing 
different bodies of information that we don’t yet recognize are co-
referential. And, if we do later realize that the two files refer to the 
same thing, then we can merge them, or more cautiously link them, 
and thereby bring the two bodies of information together.
Many of the name-like files that we open in this way will prove 
temporary. Not every perceived tree that we have occasion to think 
about — or chair, or coffee cup, or indeed person — will prove 
worthy of a lasting entry in our mental filing system (or turn out to 
be the same as something for which we already have a lasting entry). 
And in some such cases the files we have opened for these things 
will no doubt atrophy away and cease to be available for forming 
thoughts. But again this doesn’t require us to multiply types of file. 
There is no need to view the files that get closed down as special 
demonstrative files which by their nature cease to exist once their 
defining epistemic relation is lost. From my perspective, there is no 
constitutive feature of the closed-down files that prevents them per-
sisting indefinitely as repositories of information about their refer-
ents. The reason they get closed down is not that they cannot survive 
the loss of some epistemic relation, but simply that they have faded 
away from disuse.
6 More complications
Recanati’s multiplication of files generates even more difficulties 
than those I have drawn attention to so far. Suppose I remember 
that Paul Churchland is tall. Then I recognize Paul at a conference and 
note that Paul Churchland has a beard. I conclude, quite logically, that 
someone is tall and has a beard. However, if my memory demonstrative 
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file and my recognitional file are different files, as Recanati’s story 
has it, then this inference is invalid, for nothing yet guarantees that 
Paul-remembered is the same person as Paul-recognized. We would seem 
to need an additional premise, to the effect that Paul-remembered = 
Paul-recognized. (As Recanati puts it, arguments that use the same file 
throughout are de jure entitled to presumptions of co-reference. But 
when different files are in play we need extra information to estab-
lish co-reference de facto.)
However, as Recanati himself agrees, it is highly implausible that 
my argument that someone is tall and has a beard stands in need of 
any extra premise that Paul-remembered = Paul-recognized. When I see 
Paul at the conference, I surely recognize him as the Paul that I can 
remember, and don’t need explicitly to judge that the Paul I am rec-
ognizing to have a beard is the same as the one I remember to be tall.
Recanati’s response to this extra problem is to introduce a yet fur-
ther file, a recognitional-demonstrative file. This file is activated when 
you re-encounter someone whom you could previously remember, 
and is distinguished by the fact it now enjoys two epistemically re-
warding relationships with its referent, the memory relationship and 
the current perceptual relationship. As a result, this file will acquire 
both the information that Paul Churchland is tall and that Paul Church-
land has a beard, and since this information is now housed in a single 
file we will have the desired de jure presumption of co-reference to 
draw the desired conclusion, without any need of an extra identity 
premise.
But once more this multiplication of files seems quite unneces-
sary, forced on us only by Recanati’s commitment to the idea that 
different files are constituted by different epistemically rewarding 
relations to their referents. If we drop this idea, then there is noth-
ing to stop us supposing that I have always had one name-like ency-
clopaedic Paul Churchland file that I originally formed when I first 
read Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind in the early 1980s, and 
into which I have since placed all my Paul Churchland information 
acquired from whatever sources, including the perceptual sources I 
came to be able to use once I met him.
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7 Why not be simple?
I can see no advantages in multiplying files in the way that Recanati 
does. When Recanati first defends the idea that demonstrative files 
die off, to be succeeded by memory files and recognitional files, with 
consequent transfers of information, he appeals, quoting Frege, to 
the fact that certain linguistic expressions need to be replaced in a cor-
responding way.
‘If someone wants to say today what he expressed yesterday using the 
word ‘today’, he will replace this word with ‘yesterday’.’ (81)
Well, this is of course true. But it does not bear on the point at issue. 
We can all agree that we often express our thoughts using type words 
whose reference depends on the context of utterance, and thus need 
to shift type words to keep referring to the same entity when the 
context of utterance changes. But it does not follow that the mental 
files constituting the thought expressed need to be shifted similarly. 
(Indeed the rest of the quotation Recanati takes from Frege makes 
just this point: ‘Although the thought is the same its verbal expres-
sion must be different...’)
We often use indexical words when it is clear that there is noth-
ing correspondingly indexical in our thoughts. We have already had 
the example of ‘you’ expressions of non-second-person thoughts. 
There are plenty of other similar cases. You don’t know Jane’s name, 
though I do; I know that you can see her, though I can’t. ‘That woman 
is an eminent barrister’ I tell you, invoking our mutual knowledge 
that you are looking at her. The expression may be indexical, but the 
thought I am expressing involves my permanent encyclopaedic file 
for Jane, not some temporary demonstrative file (remember that I 
myself can’t see her). There is nothing indexical about my thought. 
Even though I express my thought using the phrase ‘that woman’, 
my thought itself involves my permanent file for Jane, which does 
not shift reference with context in the same way as the phrase ‘that 
woman’’ does.
Examples could be multiplied. There is a surprisingly widespread 
tendency to infer, from the use of indexical words to express some 
thought, that the thought expressed must be similarly indexically 
structured. But it does not take much reflection on cases to show 
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that this inference is generally invalid.
Is there any other reason to suppose that we have short-lived ‘de-
monstrative’ mental file tokens of the kind that Recanati posits? A 
strongly verificationist account of concepts might hold that every dis-
tinct criterion of application demands a distinct concept, in order to 
rule out irresoluble disagreements. But even the logical empiricists 
rejected this extreme ‘operationalism’ on the grounds that it would 
require an absurd proliferation of concepts, and were happy to rec-
ognize concepts with multiple criteria of application. Similarly, in 
the present context, there seems no rationale for requiring that ev-
ery ‘epistemically rewarding relation’ generates its own mental file. 
Why not simply allow that many such relations can become attached 
to stable encyclopaedic files?
8 Perception and action
A rather different thought would be that we need to recognize de-
monstrative files, not because they have distinguished epistemic in-
puts, but because they have special behavioural outputs.
Suppose that I want to grab, or parry, or move away from or to-
wards some specific physical item. To guide my behaviour, won’t I 
need to think of it as that thing there [that I can see/feel/hear]?
I think that this is indeed right, and that it does argue in favour 
of a re-usable type of mental term (that thing there), tokens of which 
are used on particular occasions to guide behaviour. But just as with 
the current addressee terms discussed earlier, there is no reason to view 
these terms as associated with any files, nor to suppose that they play 
any significant role in thought.
I take it that the direct control of fine-tuned motor behaviour is 
managed by an automatic sub-personal system, analogous to the sys-
tem that determines which words we use to voice our thoughts. This 
motor control system will respond to directives like grab that thing 
there [that I can see/feel/hear], and to this extent will indeed deploy to-
kens of a type mental term that thing there. But this automatic motor 
control system is not in the business of storing information about the 
things it refers to, and so will not have any information-accumulating 
files associated with its tokens of that thing there.
David Papineau172
Just as with the speech production system, the motor control sys-
tem will need to interface with conceptual thought along the way to 
arriving at instructions like grab that thing there. Suppose I want to 
look up a passage in Naming and Necessity. I will need physically to get 
hold of the book and leaf through it. In order to do this I need to ar-
rive at a judgement that Naming and Necessity is that thing there, which 
I can then put together with my desire to grab Naming and Necessity to 
generate the motor instruction grab that thing there.4
As before, there is no limit to the kind of conceptual information 
that might help generate the judgement Naming and Necessity is that 
thing there. In a simple case, I might simply see that Naming and Neces-
sity is in its normal place in my bookshelf. But I might also note that 
a blue hardback is on the common room table, and remember that 
John Colleague had told me that he hadn’t been able to find his copy 
of Naming and Necessity since he’d taken it to the common room to 
show the new lecturer that he didn’t understand Kripke...
Still, once I have generated the information that Naming and Neces-
sity is that thing there, by whatever means, and thence generated the 
instruction grab that thing there, I can simply hand matters over to the 
behaviour-control system. We can think of this system as represent-
ing the book as a grabbable item standing in a specific relation to my 
body, limbs and possible behaviour. To this extent the automatic sys-
tem will be representing the book in the same way as it would rep-
resent any similarly sized and shaped item that is similarly grabbable. 
That is, it will be using a temporary token of a type representation, 
a type that may well be re-used on other occasions when a similar 
object is to be grabbed. But this automatic system won’t treat this 
token as a file in which to accumulate information about its refer-
ent. After all, the behaviour-control system doesn’t want to know 
anything about this referent, beyond its egocentric location and grab-
bability. That is why it is perfectly adequate for its purposes simply 
to represent it using a temporary token of the type that thing there.
4 It is tempting to view conscious perception as the medium of this interface. 
It seems plausible that conscious perception simultaneously represents entities 
conceptually, as re-identifiable items about which we have stored information, and 
egocentrically, as items to which we bear such-and-such a current spatial relation.
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I have already argued that personal-level conceptual thought has 
no good use for temporary files corresponding to such temporary 
tokens of that thing there. As I pointed out in section 6 above, at the 
personal level it makes far more sense to coin non-temporary name-
like files for the things that we perceive, files which can outlast our 
perceptual contact with those items and in which we can preserve 
any information we glean about them. At the personal level, tem-
porary files which do not outlast perceptual contact would simply 
generate extra cognitive work to no good advantage.
So, to sum up, reflection on the nature of behavioural guidance 
does indeed point to the existence of ‘perceptual demonstratives’ 
that come in types and whose tokens do not survive the loss of per-
ceptual contact. But there is no reason why these terms should func-
tion as mental files of the kind Recanati is interested in. The function 
of these terms is to direct the motor control system to perform cer-
tain types of behaviour, not to accumulate information about their 
referents.
9 Conclusion
Recanati is greatly to be thanked for developing a detailed theory of 
mental files. His book will bring shape to the debate on this topic 
and define the agenda for future discussions. In my view, however, 
his emphasis on the ‘indexicality’ of mental files is misplaced. At best 
this emphasis is misleading, and at worst it leads to the postulation of 
far more mental files than are needed.5
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5 I would like to thank Mark Textor for helpful comments on an earlier ver-
sion of this paper.
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